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Abstract In IWOCA 2019, Ruangwises and Itoh introduced stable noncross-
ing matchings, where participants of each side are aligned on each of two par-
allel lines, and no two matching edges are allowed to cross each other. They
defined two stability notions, strongly stable noncrossing matching (SSNM)
and weakly stable noncrossing matching (WSNM), depending on the strength
of blocking pairs. They proved that a WSNM always exists and presented an
O(n2)-time algorithm to find one for an instance with n men and n women.
They also posed open questions of the complexities of determining existence
of an SSNM and finding a largest WSNM. In this paper, we show that both
problems are solvable in polynomial time. Our algorithms are applicable to
extensions where preference lists may include ties, except for one case which
we show to be NP-complete. This NP-completeness holds even if each person’s
preference list is of length at most two and ties appear in only men’s preference
lists. To complement this intractability, we show that the problem is solvable
in polynomial time if the length of preference lists of one side is bounded by
one (but that of the other side is unbounded).
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1 Introduction
In the classical stable marriage problem [8], there are two sets of participants,
traditionally illustrated as men and women, where each person has a preference
list that orders a subset of the members of the opposite gender. This variant is
called the stable marriage with incomplete liests, or SMI for short. A matching
is a set of (man, woman)-pairs where no person appears more than once. A
blocking pair for a matching M is (informally) a pair of a man and a woman
who are not matched together inM but both of them become better off if they
are matched. A matching that admits no blocking pair is a stable matching.
The stable marriage problem is one of the recently best-studied topics, with
a lot of applications to matching and assignment systems, such as high-school
match [1,2] and medical resident assignment [22]. See some textbooks [18,10,
24,20] for more information.
Recently, Ruangwises and Itoh [25] incorporated the notion of noncrossing
matchings [3,6,16,19,27] to the stable marriage problem. In their model, there
are two parallel lines where n men are aligned on one line and n women
are aligned on the other line. A matching is noncrossing if no two edges of
it cross each other. A stable noncrossing matching is a matching which is
simultaneously stable and noncrossing. They defined two notions of stability:
In a strongly stable noncrossing matching (SSNM), the definition of a blocking
pair is the same as that of the standard stable marriage problem. Thus the set
of SSNMs is exactly the intersection of the set of stable matchings and that
of noncrossing matchings. In a weakly stable noncrossing matching (WSNM),
a blocking pair has an additional condition that it must not cross matching
edges. Ruangwises and Itoh [25] proved that a WSNM exists for any instance,
and presented an O(n2)-time algorithm for the problem of find a WSNM
(denoted Find WSNM). They also demonstrated that an SSNM does not
always exist, and that there can be WSNMs of different sizes. Concerning these
observations, they posed open questions on the complexities of the problems
of determining the existence of an SSNM (denoted Exist SSNM) and finding
a WSNM of maximum cardinality (denoted Max WSNM).
Our Contributions. Table 1 summarizes previous and our results, where our
results are described in bold. We first show that both the above mentioned
open problems are solvable in polynomial time. Specifically, Exist SSNM is
solved in O(n2)-time by exploiting the well-known Rural Hospitals theorem
(Proposition 1) and Max WSNM is solved in O(n4)-time by an algorithm
based on dynamic programming (Theorem 3).
We then consider extended problems where preference lists may include
ties. When ties are allowed in preference lists, the problem is denoted SMTI
and there are three stability notions, super-, strong, and weak stabilities [12].
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We show that our algorithm for solvingMax WSNM is applicable to all of the
three stability notions with slight modifications (Corollary 3). We also show
that our algorithm for solving Exist SSNM can be applied to super- and
strong stabilities without any modification (Corollaries 1 and 2). In contrast,
we show that Exist SSNM is NP-complete for the weak stability (Theorem 1).
This NP-completeness holds even for a restricted case where the length
of each person’s preference list is at most two and ties appear in only men’s
preference lists. To complement this intractability, we show that if each man’s
preference list contains at most one woman (but women’s preference lists may
be of unbounded length), the problem is solvable in O(n)-time (Theorem 2). If
we parameterize this problem by two positive integers p and q that bound the
lengths of preference lists of men and women, respectively, Theorems 1 shows
that the problem is NP-complete even if p ≤ 2 and q ≤ 2, while Theorem
2 shows that the problem is solvable in polynomial time if p = 1 or q = 1
(by symmetry of men and women). Thus the computational complexity of
the problem is completely solved in terms of the length of preference lists.
We remark that this is a rare case since many NP-hard variants of the stable
marriage problem can be solved in polynomial time if the length of preference
lists of one side is bounded by two [13,5,4,21].
Table 1 Previous and our results (our results in bold).
Exist SSNM Find WSNM Max WSNM
SMI O(n2) [Proposition 1] O(n2) [25] O(n4) [Theorem 3]
SMTI super O(n2) [Corollary 1] O(n4) [Corollary 3]
strong O(n3) [Corollary 2] O(n4) [Corollary 3]
weak NPC∗1 [Theorem 1] O(n4) [Corollary 3]
O(n)∗2 [Theorem 2]
∗1 even if each person’s preference list contains at most two persons and ties appear in only
men’s preference lists.
∗2 if each man’s preference list contains at most one woman.
Progress from the Conference Version. A preliminary version of this
paper appeared in the proceedings of the 31st International Workshop on
Combinatorial Algorithms (IWOCA 2020) [11]. In [11], only NP-completeness
was shown for Exist SSNM in the weak stability in SMTI (of unbounded-
length preference lists). In the current manuscript, we investigated the com-
putational complexity of this problem in terms of the length of preference
lists: We strengthened the reduction in the proof of Theorem 1 to show that
NP-completeness holds even if the length of preference lists is at most two.
Moreover, we added Theorem 2 that shows that the problem can be solved in
polynomial time if the length of preference lists of one-side is at most one. As
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mentioned previously, these two theorems solve the computational complexity
of this problem in terms of the length of preference lists.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we give necessary definitions and notations, some of which
are taken from Ruangwises and Itoh [25]. An instance consists of n men
m1,m2, . . . ,mn and n women w1, w2, . . . , wn. We assume that the men are
lying on a vertical line in an increasing order of indices from top to bottom,
and similarly the women are lying in the same manner on another vertical
line parallel to the first one. Each person has a preference list over a subset of
the members of the opposite gender. For now, assume that preference lists are
strict, i.e., do not contain ties. We call such an instance an SMI-instance. If a
person q appears in a person p’s preference list, we say that q is acceptable to
p. If p and q are acceptable to each other, we say that (p, q) is an acceptable
pair. We assume without loss of generality that acceptability is mutual, i.e., p
is acceptable to q if and only if q is acceptable to p. If p prefers q1 to q2, then
we write q1 ≻p q2.
A matching is a set of acceptable pairs of a man and a woman in which
each person appears at most once. If (m,w) ∈ M , we write M(m) = w and
M(w) = m. If a person p is not included in a matching M , we say that p is
single in M and write M(p) = ∅. Every person prefers to be matched with an
acceptable person rather than to be single, i.e., q ≻p ∅ holds for any p and any
q acceptable to p.
A pair in a matching can be seen as an edge on the plane, so we may use
“pair” and “edge” interchangeably. Two edges (mi, wj) and (mx, wy) are said
to cross each other if they share an interior point, or formally, if (x−i)(y−j) <
0 holds. A matching is noncrossing if it contains no pair of crossing edges.
For a matching M , an acceptable pair (m,w) 6∈ M is called a blocking
pair for M (or (m,w) blocks M) if both w ≻m M(m) and m ≻w M(w) hold.
A noncrossing blocking pair for M is a blocking pair for M that does not
cross any edge of M . A matching M is a weakly stable noncrossing matching
(WSNM) if M is noncrossing and does not admit any noncrossing blocking
pair. A matching M is a strongly stable noncrossing matching (SSNM) if M
is noncrossing and does not admit any blocking pair. Note that an SSNM is
always a WSNM by definition but the converse is not true.
We then extend the above definitions to the case where preference lists
may contain ties. A tie of a person p’s preference list is a set of one or more
persons who are equally preferred by p, and p’s preference list is a strict order
of ties. We call such an instance an SMTI-instance. In a person p’s preference
list, suppose that a person q1 is in tie T1, q2 is in tie T2, and p prefers T1 to
T2. Then we say that p strictly prefers q1 to q2 and write q1 ≻p q2. If q1 and
q2 are in the same tie (including the case that q1 and q2 are the same person),
we write q1 =p q2. If q1 ≻p q2 or q1 =p q2 holds, we write q1 p q2 and say
that p weakly prefers q1 to q2.
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When ties are present, there are three possible definitions of blocking pairs,
and accordingly, there are three stability notions, super-stability, strong stabil-
ity, and weak stability [12]:
– In the super-stability, a blocking pair for a matching M is an acceptable
pair (m,w) 6∈M such that w m M(m) and m w M(w).
– In the strong stability, a blocking pair for a matching M is an acceptable
pair (p, q) 6∈M such that q p M(p) and p ≻q M(q). Note that the person
q, who strictly prefers the counterpart p of the blocking pair, may be either
a man or a woman.
– In the weak stability, a blocking pair for a matching M is an acceptable
pair (m,w) 6∈M such that w ≻m M(m) and m ≻w M(w).
With these definitions of blocking pairs, the terms “noncrossing blocking
pair”, “WSNM”, and “SSNM” for each stability notion can be defined analo-
gously. In the SMTI case, we extend the names of stable noncrossing matchings
using the type of stability as a prefix. For example, a WSNM in the super-
stability is denoted super-WSNM.
Note that, in this paper, the terms “weak” and “strong” are used in two
different meanings. This might be confusing but we decided not to change
these terms, respecting previous literature.
For implementation of our algorithms, we use ranking arrays described in
Sect. 1.2.3 of [10]. Although in [10] ranking arrays are defined for complete
preference lists without ties, they can easily be modified for incomplete lists
and/or with ties. Then, by the aid of ranking arrays, we can determine, given
persons p, q1, and q2, whether q1 ≻p q2 or q2 ≻p q1 or q1 =p q2 in constant
time. Also we can determine, given m and w, if (m,w) is an acceptable pair
or not in constant time.
3 Strongly Stable Noncrossing Matchings
3.1 SMI
In SMI, an easy observation shows that existence of an SSNM can be deter-
mined in O(n2) time:
Proposition 1 There exists an O(n2)-time algorithm to find an SSNM or to
report that none exists, given an SMI-instance.
Proof Note that an SSNM is a stable matching in the original sense. In SMI,
there always exists at least one stable matching [10], and due to the Rural
Hospitals theorem [9,22,23], the set of matched agents is the same in any
stable matching. These agents can be determined in O(n2) time by using
the Gale-Shapley algorithm [8]. There is only one way of matching them in a
noncrossing manner. Hence the matching constructed in this way is the unique
candidate for an SSNM. All we have to do is to check if it stable, which can
be done in O(n2) time. ⊓⊔
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3.2 SMTI
In the presence of ties, super-stable and strongly stable matchings do not
always exist. However, there is an O(n2)-time (O(n3)-time, respectively) al-
gorithm that finds a super-stable (strongly stable, respectively) matching or
reports that none exists [12,17]. Also, the Rural Hospitals theorem takes over
to the super-stability [14] and strong stability [15]. Therefore, the same algo-
rithm as in Sect. 3.1 applies for these cases, implying the following corollaries:
Corollary 1 There exists an O(n2)-time algorithm to find a super-SSNM or
to report that none exists, given an SMTI-instance.
Corollary 2 There exists an O(n3)-time algorithm to find a strong-SSNM or
to report that none exists, given an SMTI-instance.
In contrast, the problem becomes NP-complete for the weak stability even
for a highly restricted case:
Theorem 1 The problem of determining if a weak-SSNM exists, given an
SMTI-instance, is NP-complete, even if each person’s preference list contains
at most two persons and ties appear in only men’s preference lists.
Proof Membership in NP is obvious. We show NP-hardness by a reduction
from 3SAT [7]. Its instance consists of a set of variables and a set of clauses.
Each variable takes either true (1) or false (0). A literal is a variable or its
negation. A clause is a disjunction of at most three literals. A clause is satisfied
if at least one of its literals takes the value 1, and is unsatisfied otherwise. A
0/1 assignment to variables that satisfies all the clauses is called a satisfying
assignment. An instance f of 3SAT is satisfiable if it has at least one satisfying
assignment; otherwise f is unsatisfiable. 3SAT asks if there exists a satisfying
assignment. 3SAT is NP-complete even if each variable appears at most three
times, at most twice positively and at most twice negatively, and each clause
contains two or three literals [26]. We use 3SAT instances restricted in this
way.
Now we show the reduction. Let f be an instance of 3SAT having n vari-
ables xi(1 ≤ i ≤ n) and m clauses Cj(1 ≤ j ≤ m). For k = 2, 3, we call a
clause containing k literals a k-clause. Suppose that there are m2 2-clauses
and m3 3-clauses (thus m2 +m3 = m), and assume without loss of generality
that Cj(1 ≤ j ≤ m2) are 2-clauses and Cj(m2 + 1 ≤ j ≤ m) are 3-clauses.
For each variable xi, we construct a variable gadget. It consists of six men
pi,1, pi,2, pi,3, pi,4, ai,1, and ai,2, and four women qi,1, qi,2, qi,3, and qi,4. A
variable gadget corresponding to xi is called an xi-gadget. For each clause Cj ,
we construct a clause gadget. If Cj is a 2-clause, we create one man yj and two
women zj,1 and zj,2. If Cj is a 3-clause, we create seven men yj,k (1 ≤ k ≤ 7)
and nine women vj,k (1 ≤ k ≤ 6) and zj,k (1 ≤ k ≤ 3). A clause gadget
corresponding to Cj is called a Cj -gadget. Additionally, we create a man s and
a woman t, who constitute a gadget called the separator.
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Thus, there are 6n+m2+7m3+1 men and 4n+2m2+9m3+1 women in
the created SMTI-instance, denoted I(f). Finally, we add dummy persons who
have empty preference lists to make the numbers of men and women equal.
They do not play any role in the following arguments, so we omit them.
Suppose that xi’s kth positive occurrence (k = 1, 2) is in the di,kth clause
Cdi,k as the ei,kth literal (1 ≤ ei,k ≤ 3). Similarly, suppose that xi’s kth
negative occurrence (k = 1, 2) is in the gi,kth clause Cgi,k as the hi,kth literal
(1 ≤ hi,k ≤ 3). Then preference lists of ten persons in the xi-gadget are
constructed as shown in Fig. 1. Here, each preference list is described as a
sequence from left to right according to preference, i.e., the leftmost person
is the most preferred and the rightmost person is the least preferred. Tied
persons (i.e., persons with the equal preference) are included in parentheses.
In the figure, both zgi,2,hi,2 and zdi,2,ei,2 are written but actually either one
is null depending on which polarity of xi occurs once. Men are aligned in the
order of pi,1, pi,3, ai,1, ai,2, pi,2, and pi,4 from top to bottom, and women are
aligned in the order of qi,1, qi,3, qi,2, and qi,4. (See Fig. 2. Edges depicted in
the figure are those within the variable gadget.)
pi,1: qi,1 zgi,1,hi,1 qi,1: ai,1 pi,1
ai,1: (qi,1 qi,2) qi,2: ai,1 pi,2
pi,2: qi,2 zdi,1,ei,1
pi,3: qi,3 zgi,2,hi,2 qi,3: ai,2 pi,3
ai,2: (qi,3 qi,4) qi,4: ai,2 pi,4
pi,4: qi,4 zdi,2,ei,2
Fig. 1 Preference lists of persons in xi-gadget.
Fig. 2 Alignment of agents in a variable gadget.
It might be helpful to explain here intuition behind a variable gadget.
People there are partitioned into two groups, {pi,1, ai,1, pi,2, qi,1, qi,2} and
{pi,3, ai,2, pi,4, qi,3, qi,4}. The first group corresponds to the first positive oc-
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currence and the first negative occurrence of xi. It has two stable matchings
{(pi,1, qi,1), (ai,1, qi,2)} (blue in Fig. 2) and {(ai,1, qi,1), (pi,2, qi,2)} (red). We
associate the former with the assignment xi = 0 and the latter with the assign-
ment xi = 1. The second group corresponds to the second positive occurrence
and the second negative occurrence of xi (if any). It has two stable matchings
{(pi,3, qi,3), (ai,2, qi,4)} (blue) and {(ai,2, qi,3), (pi,4, qi,4)} (red). We associate
the former with xi = 0 and the latter with xi = 1. Entanglement of two groups
in Fig. 2 plays a role of ensuring consistency of assignments between the first
and the second groups. Depending on the choice of the matching in the first
group, edges with the same color must be chosen from the second group to
avoid edge-crossing.
Let us continue the reduction. We then construct preference lists of clause
gadgets. Consider a clause Cj , and suppose that its kth literal is of a variable
xjk . Define ℓj,k as
ℓj,k =


1 if this is the 1st negative occurrence of xjk
2 if this is the 1st positive occurrence of xjk
3 if this is the 2nd negative occurrence of xjk
4 if this is the 2nd positive occurrence of xjk .
If Cj is a 2-clause (respectively, 3-clause), then the preference lists of persons
in the Cj-gadget are as shown in Fig. 3 (respectively, Fig. 4). The alignment
order of persons in each clause gadget is the same as in Figs. 3 and 4. Since a
clause gadget for a 3-clause is complicated, we show a structure in the leftmost
figure of Fig. 5 (three matchings Nj,1, Nj,2, and Nj,3 will be used later).
yj : (zj,1 zj,2) zj,1: yj pj1,ℓj,1
zj,2: yj pj2,ℓj,2
Fig. 3 Preference lists of persons in Cj -gadget (1 ≤ j ≤ m2).
yj,1: (vj,1 vj,3) vj,1: yj,1
yj,2: (vj,2 zj,1) vj,2: yj,2
yj,3: (vj,3 vj,4) vj,3: yj,1 yj,3
yj,4: (zj,2 vj,5) zj,1: yj,2 pj1,ℓj,1
yj,5: (vj,4 vj,6) zj,2: yj,4 pj2,ℓj,2
yj,6: (vj,5 zj,3) vj,4: yj,5 yj,3
yj,7: vj,6 vj,5: yj,6 yj,4
vj,6: yj,5 yj,7
zj,3: yj,6 pj3,ℓj,3
Fig. 4 Preference lists of persons in Cj -gadget (m2 + 1 ≤ j ≤ m).
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Fig. 5 Acceptability graph of a 3-clause gadget Cj and its matchings Nj,1, Nj,2, and Nj,3.
Finally, each of the man and the woman in the separator includes only the
other in the list (Fig. 6). They are guaranteed to be matched together in any
stable matching.
s: t t: s
Fig. 6 Preference lists of the man and the woman in the separator.
Alignment of the whole instance is depicted in Fig. 7. Variable gadgets
are placed top, then followed by the separator, clause gadgets come bottom.
The separator plays a role of prohibiting a person of a variable gadget to
be matched with a person of a clause gadget; if they are matched, then the
corresponding edge crosses the separator.
Now the reduction is completed. It is not hard to see that the reduction
can be performed in polynomial time and the conditions on the preference lists
stated in the theorem are satisfied.
We then show the correctness. First, suppose that f is satisfiable and let
A be a satisfying assignment. We construct a weak-SSNM M of I(f) from A.
For an xi-gadget, define two matchings
– Mi,0 = {(pi,1, qi,1), (ai,1, qi,2), (pi,3, qi,3), (ai,2, qi,4)} (blue in Fig. 2) and
– Mi,1 = {(ai,1, qi,1), (pi,2, qi,2), (ai,2, qi,3), (pi,4, qi,4)} (red in Fig. 2).
If xi = 0 under A, then add Mi,0 to M ; otherwise, add Mi,1 to M . For a Cj-
gadget (1 ≤ j ≤ m2), we define two matchings Nj,1 = {(yj, zj,2)} and Nj,2 =
{(yj, zj,1)}. For a Cj-gadget (m2 + 1 ≤ j ≤ m), we define three matchings
– Nj,1 = {(yj,1, vj,1), (yj,2, vj,2), (yj,3, vj,3), (yj,4, zj,2), (yj,5, vj,6), (yj,6, zj,3)},
– Nj,2 = {(yj,1, vj,3), (yj,2, zj,1), (yj,3, vj,4), (yj,4, vj,5), (yj,5, vj,6), (yj,6, zj,3)},
and
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Fig. 7 Alignment of agents.
– Nj,3 = {(yj,1, vj,3), (yj,2, zj,1), (yj,4, zj,2), (yj,5, vj,4), (yj,6, vj,5), (yj,7, vj,6)},
that are depicted in Fig. 5. Note that, for each k(= 1, 2, 3), only zj,k (among
zj,1, zj,2, and zj,3) is single in Nj,k. If Cj is satisfied by the kth literal (k =
1, 2, 3), then add Nj,k to M . (If Cj is satisfied by more than one literal, then
choose one arbitrarily.) Finally add the pair (s, t) to M .
It is not hard to see that M is noncrossing. We show that it is weakly
stable. Clearly, neither s nor t in the separator forms a blocking pair. Next,
consider the xi-gadget. InMi,0, women qi,2 and qi,4 are matched with the first-
choice man. The woman qi,1 is matched with the second-choice man pi,1 but
her first-choice man ai,1 is matched with a first-choice woman qi,2. Similarly,
qi,3’s first-choice man ai,2 is matched with a first-choice woman qi,4. Men pi,1,
ai,1, pi,3, and ai,2 are matched with a first-choice woman. Hence these persons
cannot be a part of a blocking pair; only pi,2 and pi,4 may participate in a
blocking pair. Similarly, we can argue that, in Mi,1, only pi,1 and pi,3 may
participate in a blocking pair.
For a Cj-gadget (1 ≤ j ≤ m2), in either Nj,1 and Nj,2, both the matched
persons obtain a first-choice partner. Consider a Cj-gadget (m2+1 ≤ j ≤ m).
In Nj,1, all the men except for yj,7 are matched with a first-choice woman.
yj,7’s unique choice vj,6 is matched with the first-choice man yj,5. Hence no
man in this gadget can participate in a blocking pair, and so no blocking pair
exists within this gadget. Since zj,2 and zj,3 are matched with their respective
first-choice woman, only the possibility is that zj,1 forms a blocking pair with
pj1,ℓj,1 of a variable gadget. The same observation applies for Nj,2 and Nj,3
and we can see that for each k(= 1, 2, 3) only zj,k can participate in a blocking
pair in Nj,k.
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To summarize, if there exists a blocking pair, it must be of the form
(pi,ℓ, zj,k) for some i, ℓ, j, and k, and both pi,ℓ and zj,k are single inM . Suppose
that ℓ = 1. The reason for (pi,1, zj,k) being an acceptable pair is that Cj ’s kth
literal is ¬xi, a negative occurrence of xi. Since pi,1 is single, Mi,1 ⊂ M and
hence xi = 1 under A. Since zj,k is single, Nj,k ⊂M and hence Cj is satisfied
by its kth literal ¬xi, but this is a contradiction. The other cases ℓ = 2, 3, 4
can be argued in the same manner, and we can conclude that M is stable.
Conversely, suppose that I(f) admits a weak-SSNM M . We construct a
satisfying assignment A of f . Before giving construction, we observe structural
properties of M in two lemmas:
Lemma 1 For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), either Mi,0 ⊂M or Mi,1 ⊂M .
Proof Note that preference lists of the ten persons of the xi-gadget include
persons of the same xi-gadget or some persons from clause gadgets. Hence,
due to the separator, persons of the xi-gadget can only be matched within
this gadget to avoid edge-crossings.
Note that a stable matching is a maximal matching. With regard
to pi,1, ai,1, pi,2, qi,1, and qi,2, there are three maximal matchings
{(pi,1, qi,1), (ai,1, qi,2)}, {(ai,1, qi,1), (pi,2, qi,2)}, and {(pi,1, qi,1), (pi,2, qi,2)},
but the last one is blocked by (ai,1, qi,1) and (ai,1, qi,2). Hence either the first or
the second one must be inM . With regard to pi,3, ai,2, pi,4, qi,3, and qi,4, there
are three maximal matchings {(pi,3, qi,3), (ai,2, qi,4)}, {(ai,2, qi,3), (pi,4, qi,4)},
and {(pi,3, qi,3), (pi,4, qi,4)}, but the last one is blocked by (ai,2, qi,3) and
(ai,2, qi,4). Hence either the first or the second one must be in M .
If we choose {(pi,1, qi,1), (ai,1, qi,2)}, then we must choose
{(pi,3, qi,3), (ai,2, qi,4)} to avoid edge-crossing, which constitute Mi,0. If we
choose {(ai,1, qi,1), (pi,2, qi,2)}, then we must choose {(ai,2, qi,3), (pi,4, qi,4)},
which constitute Mi,1. Hence either Mi,0 or Mi,1 must be a part of M . ⊓⊔
Lemma 2 (i) For a Cj-gadget (1 ≤ j ≤ m2), at least one of zj,1 and zj,2 is
unmatched in M . (ii) For a Cj-gadget (m2 + 1 ≤ j ≤ m), at least one of zj,1,
zj,2, and zj,3 is unmatched in M .
Proof (i) Note that preference lists of the three persons of the Cj-gadget in-
clude persons of the same Cj-gadget or some persons from variable gadgets.
To avoid edge-crossing, persons must be matched within the same Cj -gadget.
Then it is impossible that both zj,1 and zj,2 are matched in M .
(ii) Again, we note that people must be matched within the same Cj-
gadget. For contradiction, suppose that all zj,1, zj,2, and zj,3 are matched
in M . Then (yj,2, zj,1), (yj,4, zj,2), and (yj,6, zj,3) are in M (Fig. 8(1)). To
avoid edge-crossing, (yj,3, vj,3), (yj,3, vj,4), and (yj,7, vj,6) must not be in M
(Fig. 8(2)). The pair (yj,5, vj,4) must be in M as otherwise (yj,3, vj,4) is a
blocking pair (Fig. 8(3)). For M to be a matching, (yj,5, vj,6) must not be in
M (Fig. 8(4)). Then (yj,7, vj,6) is a blocking pair, a contradiction. ⊓⊔
For each i, either Mi,0 ⊂M or Mi,1 ⊂M holds by Lemma 1. If Mi,0 ⊂M
holds then we set xi = 0 in A, and if Mi,1 ⊂M holds then we set xi = 1 in A.
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Fig. 8 Situation in the proof of Lemma 2(ii). Red solid edges are those confirmed to be
in M , blue dashed edges are those confirmed not to be in M , and black dashed edges are
uncertain.
We show that A satisfies f . Let Cj be an arbitrary clause. In the following, we
assume that Cj is a 3-clause, but the same argument holds if Cj is a 2-clause.
By Lemma 2(ii), at least one of zj,1, zj,2, and zj,3 is unmatched in M . If there
are two or more unmatched women, then choose one arbitrarily and let this
woman be zj,k. We show that Cj is satisfied by its kth literal. Suppose not.
First suppose that the kth literal of Cj is the first positive occurrence of
xi. Then, by construction of preference lists, (pi,2, zj,k) is an acceptable pair.
If xi = 0 under A, then Mi,0 ⊂ M by construction of A, and hence pi,2 is
single in M . Thus (pi,2, zj,k) is a blocking pair, which contradicts stability of
M . Hence xi = 1 under A and Cj is satisfied by xi. When the kth literal of Cj
is the second positive occurrence of xi, the same argument holds if we replace
pi,2 by pi,4.
Next suppose that the kth literal of Cj is the first negative occurrence of
xi. Then, by construction of preference lists, (pi,1, zj,k) is an acceptable pair. If
xi = 1 under A, then Mi,1 ⊂M by construction of A, and hence pi,1 is single
in M . Thus (pi,1, zj,k) is a blocking pair, which contradicts stability of M .
Hence xi = 0 under A and Cj is satisfied by ¬xi. If the kth literal of Cj is the
second negative occurrence of xi, the same argument holds if we replace pi,1
by pi,3. Thus A is a satisfying assignment of f and the proof is completed. ⊓⊔
Next we give a positive result.
Theorem 2 The problem of determining if a weak-SSNM exists, given an
SMTI-instance, is solvable in O(n)-time if each man’s preference list contains
at most one woman.
Proof Let I be an input SMTI-instance. First, we construct a bipartite graph
GI = (UI , VI , EI), where UI and VI correspond to the sets of men and women
in I, respectively, and (m,w) ∈ EI if and only if m is a first-choice of w.
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For a vertex v ∈ VI , let d(v) denote its degree in GI . Since acceptability is
mutual, if a woman w’s preference list in I is nonempty, d(w) ≥ 1 holds. Note
that it can happen that d(w) ≥ 2 because preference lists may contain ties.
In the following lemma, we characterize (not necessarily noncrossing) stable
matchings of I.
Lemma 3 M is a stable matching of I if and only if M ⊆ EI and each woman
w ∈ VI such that d(w) ≥ 1 is matched in M .
Proof Suppose that M is stable. If M 6⊆ EI , there is an edge (m,w) ∈M \EI .
The fact (m,w) 6∈ EI means that m is not w’s first-choice so there is an
edge (m′, w) ∈ EI such that m′ ≻w m. Since (m,w) ∈ M , m′ is single in
M . Therefore, (m′, w) is a blocking pair for M , a contradiction. If there is a
woman w ∈ VI such that d(w) ≥ 1 but w is single in M , then any man m such
that (m,w) is an acceptable pair is a blocking pair because m is also single in
M , a contradiction.
Conversely, suppose that M satisfies the conditions of the right hand side.
Then each woman who has a nonempty list is matched with a first-choice man,
so there cannot be a blocking pair. ⊓⊔
By Lemma 3, our task is to select from EI one edge per woman w such
that d(w) ≥ 1, in such a way that the resulting matching is noncrossing. We
do this greedily. M is initially empty, and we add edges to M by processing
vertices of VI from top to bottom. At wi’s turn, if d(wi) ≥ 1, then choose the
topmost edge that does not cross any edge in M , and add it to M . If there is
no such edge, then we immediately conclude that I admits no weak-SSNM. If
we can successfully process all the women, we output the final matching M ,
which is a weak-SSNM.
In the following, we formalize the above idea. A pseudo-code of the whole
algorithm Weak-SSNM-1 is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Weak-SSNM-1
Input: An SMTI-instance I.
Output: A weak-SSNM M or “No” if none exists.
1: Construct a bipartite graph GI = (UI , VI , EI).
2: Let M := ∅.
3: for i = 1 to n do
4: if d(wi) ≥ 1 then
5: Let j∗ (if any) be the smallest j such that (mj , wi) ∈ EI and M ∪ {(mj , wi)} is a
noncrossing matching.
6: Let M := M ∪ {(mj∗ , wi)}.
7: if no such j∗ exists then
8: Output “No” and halt.
9: end if
10: end if
11: end for
12: Output M .
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We show the correctness. Suppose that Weak-SSNM-1 outputs a match-
ing M . M is noncrossing by the condition of line 5, and M is stable because
the construction of M follows the condition of Lemma 3.
Conversely, suppose that I admits a weak-SSNM M∗. We show that
Weak-SSNM-1 outputs a matching. Suppose not, and suppose that Weak-
SSNM-1 failed when processing woman (vertex) wk. Let M¯ be the matching
constructed so far by Weak-SSNM-1. Then for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1), wi
is single in M∗ if and only if she is single in M¯ . Also, since M∗ ⊆ EI by
Lemma 3, we can show by a simple induction that for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1),
if M∗(wi) = mp and M¯(wi) = mq, then q ≤ p. Then, at line 5, we could have
chosen (M∗(wk), wk) to add to M¯ , a contradiction.
Finally, we consider time-complexity. Since the preference list of each man
contains at most one woman, the graph GI at line 1 can be constructed in
O(n)-time and contains at most n edges. The for-loop can be executed in
O(n)-time because each edge is scanned at most once in the loop; whether
or not an edge crosses edges of M at line 5 can be done in constant time by
keeping the maximum index of the matched men in M at any stage. ⊓⊔
4 Maximum Cardinality Weakly Stable Noncrossing Matchings
In this section, we present an algorithm to find a maximum cardinalityWSNM.
For an instance I, let opt(I) denote the size of the maximum cardinality
WSNM.
4.1 SMI
Let I ′ be a given instance with men m1, . . . ,mn and women w1, . . . , wn. To
simplify the description of the algorithm, we translate I ′ to an instance I by
adding a man m0 and a woman w0, each of whom includes only the other
in the preference list, and similarly a man mn+1 and a woman wn+1, each of
whom includes only the other in the preference list. It is easy to see that, for
a WSNM M ′ of I ′, M = M ′ ∪ {(m0, w0), (mn+1, wn+1)} is a WSNM of I.
Conversely, any WSNM M of I includes the pairs (m0, w0) and (mn+1, wn+1),
and M ′ = M \ {(m0, w0), (mn+1, wn+1)} is a WSNM of I ′. Thus we have that
opt(I) = opt(I ′)+ 2. Hence, without loss of generality, we assume that a given
instance I has n + 2 men and n + 2 women, with m0, w0, mn+1, and wn+1
having the above mentioned preference lists.
LetM = {(mi1 , wj1), (mi2 , wj2), . . . , (mik , wjk)} be a noncrossing matching
of I such that i1 < i2 · · · < ik and j1 < j2 · · · < jk. We call (mik , wjk)
the maximum pair of M . Suppose that (mx, wy) is the maximum pair of a
noncrossing matching M . We call M a semi-WSNM if each of its noncrossing
blocking pair (mi, wj) (if any) satisfies x ≤ i ≤ n + 1 and y ≤ j ≤ n + 1.
Intuitively, a semi-WSNM is a WSNM up to its maximum pair. Note that any
semi-WSNM must contain (m0, w0), as otherwise it is a noncrossing blocking
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pair. For 0 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1 and 0 ≤ j ≤ n+ 1, we define X(i, j) as the maximum
size of a semi-WSNM of I whose maximum pair is (mi, wj); if I does not admit
a semi-WSNM with the maximum pair (mi, wj), X(i, j) is defined to be −∞.
Lemma 4 opt(I) = X(n+ 1, n+ 1).
Proof Note that any WSNM of I includes (mn+1, wn+1), as otherwise it is
a noncrossing blocking pair. Hence it is a semi-WSNM with the maximum
pair (mn+1, wn+1). Conversely, any semi-WSNM with the maximum pair
(mn+1, wn+1) does not include a noncrossing blocking pair and hence is also a
WSNM. Therefore, the set of WSNMs is equivalent to the set of semi-WSNMs
with the maximum pair (mn+1, wn+1). This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
To compute X(n + 1, n + 1), we shortly define quantity Y (i, j) (0 ≤ i ≤
n+1, 0 ≤ j ≤ n+1) using recursive formulas, and show that Y (i, j) = X(i, j)
for all i and j. We then show that these recursive formulas allow us to compute
Y (i, j) in polynomial time using dynamic programming.
We say that two noncrossing edges (mi, wj) and (mx, wy) (i < x, j < y)
are conflicting if they contain a noncrossing blocking pair between them;
precisely speaking, (mi, wj) and (mx, wy) are conflicting if the matching
{(mi, wj), (mx, wy)} contains a blocking pair (ms, wt) such that i ≤ s ≤ x
and j ≤ t ≤ y. Otherwise, they are nonconflicting. Intuitively, two conflicting
edges cannot be consecutive elements of a semi-WSNM.
Now Y (i, j) is defined in the Equations (1)–(4). For convenience, we assume
that −∞ + 1 = −∞. In Equation (4), Y (i′, j′) in max{} is taken among all
(i′, j′) such that (i) 0 ≤ i′ ≤ i − 1, (ii) 0 ≤ j′ ≤ j − 1, (iii) (mi′ , wj′ ) is an
acceptable pair, and (iv) (mi, wj) and (mi′ , wj′ ) are nonconflicting. If no such
(i′, j′) exists, max{Y (i′, j′)} is defined as −∞ and as a result Y (i, j) is also
computed as −∞.
Y (0, 0) = 1 (1)
Y (0, j) = −∞ (1 ≤ j ≤ n+ 1) (2)
Y (i, 0) = −∞ (1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1) (3)
Y (i, j) =
{
1 + max{Y (i′, j′)} (if (mi, wj) is an acceptable pair)
−∞ (otherwise)
(1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ n+ 1) (4)
Lemma 5 Y (i, j) = X(i, j) for any i and j such that 0 ≤ i ≤ n + 1 and
0 ≤ j ≤ n+ 1.
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Proof We prove the claim by induction. We first show that Y (0, 0) = X(0, 0).
The matching {(m0, w0)} is the unique semi-WSNM with the maximum pair
(m0, w0), so X(0, 0) = 1 by definition. Also, Y (0, 0) = 1 by Equation (1).
Hence we are done. We then show that Y (0, j) = X(0, j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n +
1. Since (m0, wj) is an unacceptable pair, there is no semi-WSNM with the
maximum pair (m0, wj), so X(0, j) = −∞ by definition. Also, Y (0, j) = −∞
by Equation (2). We can show that Y (i, 0) = X(i, 0) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1 by a
similar argument.
Next we show that Y (i, j) = X(i, j) holds for 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1 and 1 ≤ j ≤
n+1. As an induction hypothesis, we assume that Y (a, b) = X(a, b) holds for
0 ≤ a ≤ i − 1 and 0 ≤ b ≤ j − 1. First, observe that if X(i, j) 6= −∞, then
X(i, j) ≥ 2. This is because two pairs (m0, w0) and (mi, wj) must present in
any semi-WSNM having the maximum pair (mi, wj).
We first consider the case that X(i, j) ≥ 2. Let X(i, j) = k. Then, there
is a semi-WSNM M with the maximum pair (mi, wj) such that |M | = k.
Let M ′ = M \ {(mi, wj)} and (mx, wy) be the maximum pair of M ′. It is
not hard to see that M ′ is a semi-WSNM with the maximum pair (mx, wy)
and that |M ′| = k − 1. Therefore, X(x, y) ≥ k − 1 by the definition of X ,
and Y (x, y) = X(x, y) ≥ k − 1 by the induction hypothesis. Since M is a
semi-WSNM, (mi, wj) and (mx, wy) are nonconflicting, so (x, y) satisfies the
condition for (i′, j′) in Equation (4). Hence Y (i, j) ≥ 1+Y (x, y) ≥ k. Suppose
that Y (i, j) ≥ k + 1. By the definition of Y , this means that there is (i′, j′)
that satisfies conditions (i)–(iv) for Equation (4), and Y (i′, j′) ≥ k. By the
induction hypothesis, X(i′, j′) = Y (i′, j′) ≥ k. Then there is a semi-WSNM
M ′ with the maximum pair (mi′ , wj′ ) such that |M ′| ≥ k. Since M ′ is a semi-
WSNM, and (mi′ , wj′ ) and (mi, wj) are nonconflicting, M = M
′ ∪ {(mi, wj)}
is a semi-WSNM with the maximum pair (mi, wj) such that |M | = |M
′|+1 ≥
k + 1. This contradicts the assumption that X(i, j) = k. Hence Y (i, j) ≤ k
and therefore Y (i, j) = k as desired.
Finally, consider the case that X(i, j) = −∞. If (mi, wj) is unacceptable,
then the latter case of Equation (4) is applied and Y (i, j) = −∞. So assume
that (mi, wj) is acceptable. Then the former case of Equation (4) is applied.
It suffices to show that for any (i′, j′) that satisfies conditions (i)–(iv) (if any),
Y (i′, j′) = −∞ holds. Assume on the contrary that there is such (i′, j′) with
Y (i′, j′) = k. Then X(i′, j′) = k by the induction hypothesis, and there is a
semi-WSNM M ′ such that |M ′| = k, (mi′ , wj′) is the maximum pair of M ′,
and (mi′ , wj′ ) and (mi, wj) are nonconflicting. Then M = M
′ ∪ {(mi, wj)} is
a semi-WSNM such that (mi, wj) is the maximum pair and |M | = |M ′|+1 =
k + 1, implying that X(i, j) = k + 1. This contradicts the assumption that
X(i, j) = −∞ and the proof is completed. ⊓⊔
Now we analyze time-complexity of the algorithm. Computing each Y (0, 0),
Y (0, j), and Y (i, 0) can be done in constant time. For computing one Y (i, j)
according to Equation (4), there are O(n2) candidates for (i′, j′). For each
(i′, j′), checking if (mi′ , wj′) and (mi, wj) are conflicting can be done in con-
stant time with O(n4)-time preprocessing described in subsequent paragraphs.
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Therefore one Y (i, j) can be computed in time O(n2). Since there are O(n2)
Y (i, j)s, the time-complexity for computing all Y (i, j)s is O(n4). Adding the
O(n4)-time for preprocessing mentioned above, the total time-complexity of
the algorithm is O(n4).
In the preprocessing, we construct three tables S, A, and B.
– S is a Θ(n4)-sized four-dimensional table that takes logical values 0 and
1. For 0 ≤ i′ ≤ i ≤ n + 1 and 0 ≤ j′ ≤ j ≤ n + 1, S(i′, i, j′, j) = 1 if
and only if there exists at least one acceptable pair (m,w) such that m ∈
{mi′ ,mi′+1, . . . ,mi} and w ∈ {wj′ , wj′+1, . . . , wj}. Since S(i, i, j, j) = 1 if
and only if (mi, wj) is an acceptable pair, it can be computed in constant
time. In general, S(i′, i, j′, j) can be computed in constant time as follows.
S(i′, i, j′, j) =
{
1 (if (mi, wj) is an acceptable pair)
S(i′, i− 1, j′, j) ∨ S(i′, i, j′, j − 1) (otherwise)
Hence S can be constructed in O(n4) time by a simple dynamic program-
ming.
– A is a Θ(n3)-sized table. For convenience, we introduce an imaginary
person λ who is acceptable to any person, where q ≻p λ holds for any
person p and any person q acceptable to p. For 0 ≤ i ≤ n + 1 and
0 ≤ j′ ≤ j ≤ n + 1, A(i, j′, j) stores the woman whom mi most prefers
among {wj′ , . . . , wj , λ}. Then, for i and j, A(i, j, j) = wj if (mi, wj) is an
acceptable pair and A(i, j, j) = λ otherwise. A(i, j′, j) can be computed as
the better of A(i, j′, j − 1) and A(i, j, j) in mi’s list. By the above argu-
ments, each element of A can be computed in constant time and hence A
can be constructed in O(n3) time.
– B plays a symmetric role to A; for 0 ≤ i′ ≤ i ≤ n+ 1 and 0 ≤ j ≤ n + 1,
B(i′, i, j) stores the man whom wj most prefers among {mi′ , . . . ,mi, λ}. B
can also be constructed in O(n3) time.
It is easy to see that (mi′ , wj′ ) and (mi, wj) are conflicting if and only
if one of the following conditions hold. Condition 1 can be clearly checked
in constant time. Thanks to the preprocessing, Conditions 2–4 can also be
checked in constant time.
1. (mi′ , wj) or (mi, wj′ ) is a blocking pair for the matching
{(mi′ , wj′ ), (mi, wj)}.
2. S(i′ + 1, i − 1, j′ + 1, j − 1) = 1. (If this holds, there is a block-
ing pair (m,w) such that m ∈ {mi′+1,mi′+2, . . . ,mi−1} and w ∈
{wj′+1, wj′+2, . . . , wj−1}.)
3. mi prefers A(i, j
′ + 1, j − 1) to wj or mi′ prefers A(i′, j′ + 1, j − 1) to wj′ .
(If this holds, there exists a blocking pair (m,w) such that m ∈ {mi′ ,mi}
and w ∈ {wj′+1, . . . , wj−1}.)
4. wj prefers B(i
′ + 1, i − 1, j) to mi or wj′ prefers B(i′ + 1, i − 1, j′) to
mi′ . (If this holds, there exists a blocking pair (m,w) such that m ∈
{mi′+1, . . . ,mi−1} and w ∈ {wj′ , wj}).
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This completes the explanation on preprocessing, and from the discussion
so far, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 3 There exists an O(n4)-time algorithm to find a maximum cardi-
nality WSNM, given an SMI-instance.
4.2 SMTI
Similarly to the SMI case, a weak-WSNM exists in any SMTI-instance: Given
an SMTI-instance I, break all the ties arbitrarily and obtain an SMI-instance
I ′. Let M be a WSNM of I ′. Then it is not hard to see that M is also a
weak-WSNM of I. In contrast, there is a simple instance that admits neither
a strong- nor a super-WSNM (Fig. 9). The empty matching is blocked by any
acceptable pair. The matching {(m1, w1)} is blocked by (m2, w2). The match-
ing {(m2, w2)} is blocked by (m1, w1). The matching {(m1, w1), (m2, w2)} is
blocked by (m2, w1). The matching {(m2, w1)} is blocked by (m1, w1).
m1: w1 w1: (m1 m2)
m2: w1 w2 w2: m2
Fig. 9 An instance that admits neither a strong-WSNM nor a super-WSNM.
Nevertheless, the algorithm in Sect. 4.1 can be applied to SMTI straight-
forwardly. Necessary modifications are summarized as follows:
– As mentioned above, existence of a WSNM is not guaranteed. If our al-
gorithm outputs Y (n + 1, n + 1) = −∞, then it means that no solution
exists.
– The definition of two edges (mi, wj) and (mx, wy) being conflicting must
be modified depending on one of the three stability notions.
– The definitions of the tables A and B need to be modified as fol-
lows. A(i, j′, j) stores one of the women whom mi most prefers among
{wj′ , . . . , wj , λ}. Similarly, B(i′, i, j) stores one of the men whom wj most
prefers among {mi′ , . . . ,mi, λ}.
– In the SMI case, A(i, j′, j) is computed as the better of A(i, j′, j − 1)
and A(i, j, j) in mi’s list. But now it can happen that A(i, j
′, j − 1) =mi
A(i, j, j), in which case A(i, j′, j) can be either A(i, j′, j − 1) or A(i, j, j).
(Strictly speaking, this treatment was needed already in the SMI case be-
cause there can be a case that A(i, j′, j − 1) = A(i, j, j) = λ, but there we
took simplicity.)
– Conditions 3 and 4 in checking confliction of two edges need to be modified
as follows. In the super- and strong stabilities, “prefers” should be replaced
by “weakly prefers”. In the weak stability, “prefers” should be replaced by
“strictly prefers”.
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With these modifications, whether two edges are conflicting or not can be
checked in constant time. Therefore, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 3 There exists an O(n4)-time algorithm to find a maximum cardi-
nality super-WSNM (strong-WSNM, weak-WSNM) or report that none exists,
given an SMTI-instance.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown algorithms and complexity results for the prob-
lems of determining existence of an SSNM and finding a maximum cardinality
WSNM, in the settings both with and without ties.
One of interesting future works is to consider optimization problems. For
example, in SMI we have shown that it is easy to determine if there exists an
SSNM with zero-crossing. What is the complexity of the problem of finding an
SSNM with the minimum number of crossings, and if it is NP-hard, is there a
good approximation algorithm for it? Also, it might be interesting to consider
noncrossing stable matchings for other placements of agents, e.g., on a circle
or on general position in 2-dimensional plane.
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